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Constitutional Law-State Action and Tax Benefits to Private Charita-
ble Organizations
Since June 1971, a series of federal court decisions has sustained
attacks on state and federal tax exemption and deduction provisions as
applied to racially segregated charitable and educational organizations.'
The principle emerging from these cases is that tax administrators are
under an affirmative duty to insure that recipients of the tax benefits
generally available to private charitable and educational institutions do
not practice racial discrimination in their admissions and membership
policies. All of these decisions have profound implications for federal,
state, and local tax administration. 2 One of them, Pitts v. Department
of Revenue 3 in its application of the state action doctrine, appears to
bring fourteenth amendment prohibitions more directly to bear on pri-
vate conduct than any case since Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority.4
'Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Green v. Connally, 330
F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd men. sub nora. Coit v. Green, 92 S. Ct. 564 (1971): McGlotten v.
Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
2The decree in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd men. sub non. Coit v.
Green, 92 S. Ct. 564 (1971), illustrates the kind of administrative action necessary to implement
the decisions. The Internal Revenue Service is enjoined from granting tax exempt status to any
Mississippi private school and from allowing deductions for contributions to any such school,
except upon a showing of compliance with detailed advertising requirements establishing non-
discriminatory policies in school administration, admissions, scholarship and loan programs, and
athletic and extra-curricular activities. In addition to the advertising requirements, the school must
furnish the Service with information "which the court finds material in order for the Service to be
in an effective position to determine whether the school has actually established a policy of nondis-
crimination .... " Included in this information is the racial composition of the school's student
body, applicants for admission, faculty, and administrative staff; the amount of any scholarship
aid and the racial composition of recipients; a list of incorporators, founders, board members, and
donors, and a statement as to whether any of them are identified with segregationist organizations.
330 F. Supp. at 1180. A comment on the case has suggested that its impact on actual Service
practices may be minimal because of the sheer manpower limitations. "Investigation of hiring or
admissions policy and substantive determination of whether the activities of each of some 400,000
groups conflict with public policy presents a far more massive task than the largely mechanical
decision making previously employed. The practical restrictions will probably influence courts to
avoid sweeping mandates, leaving the assault on charitable exemptions to private litigants on a
case by case basis." Note, Federal Taxation- Charities- Taxpayers May Contest IRS Allowance
of Exempt Status, and Organizations whose Activities Violate Public Policy May Not Be Accorded
Favored Tax Treatment, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 544, 549 (1972).
3333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
4365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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Wisconsin, like most states, exempts from taxation the property
and income of organizations that may be called charitable institutions.'
The statutes, drafted in broad terms, exempt the property and income6
of all churches, private schools, historical societies, women's clubs, li-
braries, and fraternal orders such as Elks and Moose lodges, and the
income of "other corporations or associations of individuals not organ-
ized or conducted for pecuniary profit." The plaintiffs in Pitts claimed
to represent a class of non-Caucasian Wisconsin taxpayers and Cauca-
sian taxpayers not affiliated with or members of organizations that
discriminate in membership on the basis of race.8 Focusing their attack
on the exemption of fraternal orders, they sought a declaration that the
exemption statutes were unconstitutional as applied to organizations
that discriminate in membership on the basis of race and an injunction
prohibiting the Department of Revenue from enforcing the statutes as
to those organizations.
The proposition that government must not fiscally subsidize racist
organizations seems scarcely debatable in the year 1971. Numerous
legal theories bolster this principle,' and under most of them a plaintiff's
'The Wisconsin statutes exempt from property taxation all
[p]roperty owned and used exclusively by educational institutions . . . churches or
religious educational or benevolent associations . . . women's clubs . . . domestic,
incorporated historical societies . . . domestic, incorporated, free public library associa-
tions [and] fraternal societies operating under the lodge system ....
WIS. STAT. § 70.11(4) (1967). Exempted from income tax is the income of "all religious, scientific,
educational, benevolent or other corporations or associations of individuals not organized or
conducted for pecuniary profit." WIs. STAT. § 71.01(3)(a) (1967). Although the Pitts plaintiffs
attacked only the exemptions of private fraternal orders, the court's holding applied to all of the
above-named exemptees. 333 F. Supp. at 670.
'WIs. STAT. §§ 70.11(4), 70.01(3)(a) (1967).
'Id. § 70.01(3)(a) (1967).
'333 F. Supp. at 669-70. The district court, relying on Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968),
held that plaintiffs' standing as taxpayers was sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. 333 F. Supp.
at 669-70. In Flast the Supreme Court held that a federal taxpayer has standing to challenge
Congressional spending programs alleged to be in violation of specific constitutional limitations
on the power of the federal government. Whether Flast properly applies to state fiscal matters,
whether it applies to exemptions from taxation as well as to appropriations, and whether the equal
protection clause is a "specific limitation" are questions beyond the scope of this note.
'Charitable institutions are not taxed because they fulfill a "public purpose," which is also a
limitation on the taxing and spending power of a state legislature. However, the beneficiaries of a
charitable activity need not include the entire public; a use is charitable if its accomplishment "is
of such social interest to the community as to justify permitting the property to be devoted to the
purpose in perpetuity." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 368, comment b at 248 (1959). Thus
an activity is charitable if it achieves a result that otherwise would be achieved only at public
expense. Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Eaton, 20 F.2d 419, 421 (D. Conn. 1927); cf H.R.
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principal burden would be the largely factual one of establishing the
proposition as an apt characterization of the particular transactions
involved: at issue would be whether a tax exemption is a significant
subsidy in light of the total financial structure of a given organization
or class of organizations and the weight to be accorded a policy of
restricted participation in organizational activities where the otherwise
charitable purposes and effects of such activities are assigned to justify
the favored treatment. It may be that no public benefit can outweigh
the interest of the victim of racial prejudice practiced by the one who
confers the benefit, and certainly categorizing an institution as charita-
ble cannot immunize it from judicial scrutiny in terms of contemporary
standards of social benefit and public good. To be sure, the courts'
freedom to apply these tests to legislative enactments is more circum-
scribed than it is when the subject before them is the validity of a
charitable trust." But this does not mean that the tests are not appropri-
REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938). See generally Clark, Charitable Trusts, the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957). But racial
discrimination arbitrarily excludes a part of the public and therefore may defeat the public charac-
ter of an activity.
The individual philanthropist cannot be indulged in his own vagaries as to what is
charitable; he must conform to some kind of norm, else he cannot obtain subsidy or tax
exemption. Similarly the general principle of a "desire to benefit one's own kind" is an
acceptable incentive to philanthropy as applied to a wide range of causes. But it takes
on a different and unacceptable hue when it is manifested as racial discrimination.
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1163 (D.D.C.), affd men. sub nonm. Coit v. Green, 92 S.
Ct. 564 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 33-35 infra. Note also the statement in
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 n.38 (D.D.C. 1972):
We do not find it significant that plaintiff does not allege . . . that the charitable
purposes to which the federal funds are put are in themselves discriminatory. Plaintiff
alleges that he and others in his position are denied the opportunity to help determine
the purposes to which the funds are devoted. Paternalism should not be confused with
equality.
McGlotten is discussed in text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
As for federal tax benefits, the McGlotten case held that INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 170(a),
(c) and 501(c)(8) constitute "federal financial assistance" within the meaning of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-4 (1970), and that plaintiffs had a cause of
action under § 601 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which provides that "[n]o person . . . shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." For a discussion of state and federal statutory bases for withdrawing tax
benefits to private segregated schools, see Note, Federal Tax Benefits to Segregated Private
Schools, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 922, 940-50 (1968).
"0The Wisconsin cases, for example, while implicitly recognizing that there are limits beyond
which the legislature may not go, allow a wide berth for legislative discretion. See Fulton Founda-
tion v. Department of Taxation, 13 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 108 N.W.2d 312, 319 (1960); Lawrence Univ.
v. Otugamie County, 150 Wis. 244, 246, 136 N.W. 619, 620 (1912).
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ate guides to statutory construction. Nor is it necessarily true that where
there is no room for construction in conformity with these standards the
legislative determination that they are met is conclusive: concepts of
public purpose have their constitutional basis in due process principles
that are as binding on the legislatures as on the courts. It is too often
forgotten that most state constitutions have due process clauses and that
the demise of "substantive due process" that has restricted judicial
review of such legislative judgments has been for the most part a pheno-
menon peculiar to the federal fifth and fourteenth amendments."
The plaintiffs in Pitts, however, selected an approach designed to
obtain an adjudication of federal constitutional right: they contended
that Wisconsin's allowance of tax benefits in favor of segregated frater-
nal orders was state action fostering racial discrimination in violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Inevitably
a high degree of risk attends an unnecessary forcing of constitutional
issues. In this case there was the additional factor that the constitutional
frame of reference within which the court was asked to operate was so
fraught with contrary precedent 2 and conflicting principles that the
court could sustain the plaintiffs' claim against the presumption of the
statute's constitutionality only "with the unfortunate certainty of com-
plicating the already complex state action concept."' 3
The Wisconsin Department of Revenue's defense was based on the
statute's "neutrality" in the matter of race. It pointed out that the
criteria for exempt status were set out in terms of institutional objectives
and that any fraternal or benevolent organization meeting the require-
ments was granted the exemption without regard to internal (member-
"See generally Carpenter, Economic Due Process and State Courts, 45 A.B.A.J. 1027 (1959);
Horn, Judicial Power Over Policy Under State Constitutions, 6 PUB. POLICY 47 (1955); Paulsen,
The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 92 (1950). Substantive
due process is not dead, of course, even in the federal practice. See Packer, The Aims of the
Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at "Substantive Due Process," 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 490 (1971).
121n addition to the Seventh Circuit cases discussed in text accompanying notes 16-21 infra,
see also Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 685 (E.D. La. 1962) ("a
simple tax benefit [does not evoke] state action. [Otherwise,] every legal creature would be within
the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 713 (4th Cir.
1964) (tax exemption not sufficient by itself to impose fourteenth amendment restrictions but "may
attain significance when viewed in combination with other attendant state involvements") (dictum);
Smith v. YMCA, 316 F. Supp. 899, 906 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (same) (dictum).
333 F. Supp. at 669.
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ship) policies. 4 From this premise the court was asked to conclude that
since the exemption provisions "do not isolate the factor of racial dis-
crimination either by their terms or application, plaintiffs cannot argue
• ..that the state encourages or is involved in private discrimina-
tions." 5 The Department of Revenue relied primarily on two recent
cases involving tax exemptions. In Walz v. Tax Commission," the Su-
preme Court held that a grant of tax exemption to religious organiza-
tions did not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment,
because the exemption amounted to only a "benevolent neutrality" and
a "minimal and remote involvement." In Chicago Joint Board, Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers of America v. Chicago Tribune,17 the plain-
tiff union claimed that by granting a use tax exemption to a newspaper
publishing company the state had so insinuated itself as to become the
author of the newspaper's denial to plaintiff of a medium of speech. The
Seventh Circuit rejected the contention in these words:
The use tax exemption, which newspapers share in common with mag-
azines and periodicals ..does represent a "state involvement" in the
limited sense that any tax exemption does, but not to a degree which
constitutes state participation in the conduct or action of the enterprise
granted the exemption.' 8
The Pitts court discussed one other recent case. In Bright v.
Isenbarger9 students in a parochial school claimed that their summary
expulsion by school officials violated their rights of procedural due
process. The Bright court, citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking A uthor-
ity, held that a tax exemption in favor of parochial schools, even when
"Where the state's involvement in discriminatory acts is established, this "neutrality" argu-
ment is subject to the stock response that "equal protection of the laws is not achieved through
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,22 (1948). the neutral-
ity asserted here, however, goes to the question of state involvement and is more substantial. See
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. Rev. 1083, 1108 (1960):
The important consideration for the state action problem is whether exemption involves
the government in an endorsement of the specific policies and goals of an exempt
organization. In the case of tax exemptions for charitable institutions, applying to very
broadly defined private activities diverse in makeup and purposes almost beyond imagi-
nation, the theory that the state and federal governments provide the assistance in an
indiscriminate manner will withstand scrutiny.
"5Brief for Defendant at 10.
"6397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
7435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
sId. at 477 (citations omitted).
"314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), affd per curiam, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
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coupled with state supervision of private education, did not "so insin-
uate the State into a position of interdependence with [the school] that
it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity."2
In discussing Walz, the Pitts court appears to have perceived some
difference between the state action doctrine and the principle applicable
to discovering a violation of the establishment clause: the Walz opinion
had not discussed "the state action doctrine as such" but had only
"weighed factors similar to those relevant to determination of state
action issues."12' The court's basis for distinguishing the Chicago Joint
Board and Bright cases is even more problematical and more signifi-
cant. The court accorded special importance to the fact that these cases
involved respectively the right of freedom of expression and the right
to procedural due process. On the basis that "equal protection rights are
to be accorded a special significance where governmental or state action
is in question," the court held that "[w]hatever its nature in other con-
texts, a tax exemption constitutes affirmative, significant state action in
an equal protection context where racial discrimination fostered by the
State is claimed," and added: "Inherent in our decision . . . and in any
distinction of Walz, Chicago Joint Board and Bright, is a determination
that a different standard must be applied to ascertain state action in
cases involving equal protection than in cases involving other rights.
' 2
The court did not define the "different standard" that applies to equal
protection cases. Just what it is about a tax exemption that "signifi-
cantly involves" the taxing authority in the racially discriminatory
membership policies of private institutional recipients of exemptions is
left for determination by the process, at best speculative, of interpreting
the result in the light of the particular facts. For its part, the court chose
to rest the decision on the conclusory observation that tax exemptions
"obviously" encourage the activities, "including racial discrimination,"
of exempted organizations.
23
Two other cases have enjoined enforcement of tax benefits in favor
of segregated institutions. McGlotten v. Connally,24 which involved fed-
eral Internal Revenue Code income tax benefits (including income tax
deductions for donors) for Pitts-type institutions, was decided three
21!d. at 1396.
2333 F. Supp. at 665.
2Id. at 668.
2Jd. at 669.
21338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
11371972]
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months subsequent to and in substantial accord with Pitts on fifth
amendment grounds. In Green v. Connally,25 also a federal income tax
case, the question of the constitutionality of exemptions and deductions
as applied to private segregated schools was not reached. Rather, the
court construed the challenged sections as not applying to such schools.
Moreover, the fact that the institutional recipients in Green were schools
rather than clubs or fraternal orders suggests the possibly critical dis-
tinction that the governmental aid represented by tax benefits, especially
charitable contribution deductions, was shown to be supportive of ef-
forts by white Mississippians to circumvent court-ordered desegrega-
tion s.2 Nevertheless, in view of the heavy reliance on Green by the Pitts
court, a brief treatment of the Green opinion at this point is in order.
The Green plaintiffs were black children attending Mississippi pub-
lic schools, and their parents. They sought alternative declaratory relief,
arguing first that sections 170 and 501 of the Internal Revenue Code"
did not authorize tax benefits operating to the advantage of deliberately
segregated private schools in Mississippi and, second, that those sec-
tions were unconstitutional to the extent they so authorized tax benefits.
Noting its pendent jurisdiction to decide the claim based on statutory
2330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd mem. sub noma. Coit v. Green, 92 S. Ct. 564 (1971).
2 Cf. Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969) (historical
maintenance of segregated public school system imposes affirmative duty to establish a system of
integrated public education, making state tuition grants to private segregated institutions in derog-
ation of that duty unconstitutional). See also Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance
Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), affd per curtain, 389 U.S. 571 (1968) (aid to segre-
gated schools that is the product of the state's policy of fostering segregated schools is unconstitu-
tional). "We distinguish . . . state aid from tax benefits, free schoolbooks, and other products of
the state's traditional policy of benevolence toward charitable and educational institutions." Id. at
854. The court in Green was careful to point out that its decision "goes beyond the class of schools
considered in our prior opinion [Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1132-37 (D.D.C.), appeal
dismissed, 400 U.S. 986 (1970)] where we discussed the constitutional problems inhering in provid-
ing tax benefits for private schools forming 'a system of segregated private schools as an alternative
available to white students seeking to avoid desegregated public schools.'" 330 F. Supp. at 1164.
But the opinion also makes clear that its inclusion of "all private schools, without reference to any
finding or determination that such schools were formed for the purpose of avoiding a unitary school
system," is based on federal public policy and not on equal protection principles. Id. Moreover,
even if the constitutional question were regarded as identical where there is no finding of purposeful
avoidance, education, "a matter affected with the greatest public interest. . . whether. . . offered
by a public or private institution" and a function historically associated with the state, presents
considerations which distinguish schools from the private charitable institutions involved in Pitts.
Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 858-59, vacated on rehearing, 207
F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curtam, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
HINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 170(a), (c) allow a deduction for charitable contributions to
defined organizations. Id. §§ 501(a), (c) exempt the income of such organizations.
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construction, the court embarked on an extended discussion of the
"underlying" law of charitable trusts."' Citing cases and treatises for the
rule that a limitation to accomplish a purpose contrary to public policy
will cause a charitable trust to fail, the court observed a modern trend
in the case law to deny enforcement of discriminatory provisions in
educational trust instruments by means of a variety of judicial tech-
niques ranging from cy pres to reverter. The court concluded, "There
is at least a grave doubt whether an educational organization that prac-
tices racial discrimination can qualify as a charitable trust under general
trust law." 9 With this perspective the court proceeded to construe the
relevant Internal Revenue Code provisions in light of federal public
policy. Finding a federal policy against federal support for segregated
private schools in the post-Civil War amendments, various Supreme
Court decisions in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education," and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court held:
The Internal Revenue Code provisions on charitable exemptions
and deductions must be construed to avoid frustrations of Federal
policy. Under the conditions of today they can no longer be construed
so as to provide to private schools operating on a racially discrimina-
tory premise the support of the exemptions and deductions which Fed-
eral tax law affords to charitable organizations and their sponsors.',
As for the Green plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment claims, the court
remarked only that "[t]he propriety of the interpretation approved by
this court is underscored by the fact that it obviates the need to deter-
mine such serious constitutional claims.
13 2
Despite the relatively narrow holding of Green and its pointed
refusal to decide the constitutional issue, the court in Pitts viewed Green
as indistinguishable. Ignoring the basis of the Green decision, it instead
1330 F. Supp. at 1157-61.
"Id. at 1157. It is well established that judicial enforcement of a racially discriminatory
limitation in a trust instrument or of a racially restrictive covenant in a deed is unconstitutional
state action. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The
suggestion in Green is of something quite different: that a charitable trust which provides a racially
discriminatory use will be invalidated as a matter of common law, at the instance of the heirs or
residuary legatees or by the court on its own motion, by subjecting the limitations to the Rule
Against Perpetuities, the rules regarding accumulations, and those against remoteness in vesting
and suspension of the power of alienation.
10347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1'330 F. Supp. at 1164.
1Id. at 1165.
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directed its attention to that part of the opinion rejecting the claim of
the intervenors, representatives of a class of white students enrolled in
the private schools and their parents. The intervenors had contended
that construction of the Code to exclude them and their schools from
the exemptions and deductions would violate their first amendment
rights to freedom of association. In response to these claims the court
declared that the goyernmental interest in preventing racial discrimina-
tion is "dominant over other constitutional interests to the extent that
there is complete and unavoidable conflict"33 and observed that the
"governmental and constitutional interest of avoiding racial discrimina-
tion in educational institutions embraces the interest of avoiding even
the 'indirect economic benefit' of a tax exemption."'
4
Thus these statements-which, Pitts concludes, compel the result
that tax exemptions for racially restrited clubs constitute unconstitu-
tional state action-were actually made in the course of a ruling that
the right to free association in the form of private segregated education
does not include a right to governmental support through tax benefits.
The statements mean only that the state has, consistent with the free-
dom of association, a constitutional interest in discouraging racial dis-
crimination which justifies it in withdrawing all forms of support from
discriminatory organizations, not that it has a constitutional obligation
to do so. Yet Pitts held that any governmental financial assistance,
however economically negligible and however benign its purpose, is
unconstitutional state action if it appears that the recipient in some way,
whether or not related to the purpose of the assistance, practices racial
discrimination. The implications of this holding must be examined in its
historical context.
It is familiar learning that, with scattered few exceptions here im-
material, constitutional prohibitions are addressed to government. This
follows not only from the literal terms of the constitution but also from
the essential character of constitutional government. Constitutions are
written to define the scope of governmental interference in the affairs
of constituents. Although the understanding with respect to the validity
of these general observations as applied to the fourteenth amendment
has been the subject of some controversy among scholars, 35 the Su-
AId. at 1167.
3 Id. at 1169.
3Several writers maintain that the judicial distinction between state and private action is a
departure from the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment. See A. B3LAUsTrIN & C.
1140 [Vol. 50
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preme Court very early registered its adherence to the position that the
amendment's prohibitions operate only on the states. 6 Verbal reaffirm-
ance of the rule is still a ritual with the modern judiciary, most scrupu-
lously observed where it appears least reconcilable with the result. A
strict requirement of state action, however, assumes an anachronistic
model of social organization. Oriented toward a time when government
was the only institution sufficiently powerful to pose any threat to indi-
vidual liberty, it is ill-equipped to account for the potential impact on
personal liberty of modern corporate social structure. An accommoda-
tion had to be made, because eventually it became apparent that certain
freedoms had to be protected from private infringements as well as from
governmental ones. Thus, modern state action doctrine developed as a
device for bringing fourteenth amendment proscriptions to bear on pri-
vate conduct by ascribing that conduct to the state.37 To those who
value predictability in the law, "state action" is an exasperating subject.
The extreme difficulty of making any meaningful statement about state
action generally is a consequence of the manifold contexts in which the
problem is presented: the permutations of the claims of constitutional
right and the instances of private-governmental interaction are virtually
limitless. But whether the case is one of governmental control over the
FURGESON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 92 (1957); H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 277 (1909); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 347
(1963). But see Avins, State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 MERCER L. REv. 352
(1966).
"United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313,
318 (1880); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643-44 (1882).
3Actually, two theoretical directions have been taken. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946), and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), head a line of cases enforcing constitutional
prohibitions against private organizations engaged in a public or governmental function. This kind
of enforcement, relatively restricted in its application, is an extension of the meaning of "state" to
include not only the official organs of state government but also the arrogation of governmental
authority or power in the exercise of an activity normally associated with the state or traditionally
within its province. See Note, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to Private Organiza-
tions, 61 HARV. L. REV. 344 (1948). Of course, principles derived from the public function cases
influence the decision of governmental action cases, and vice versa. For example, the Court in
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), relied both on the public nature of the recreational facility
and on the fact that court appointment of private trustees in order to preserve the segregated
character of the park is state action. Similarly, one interpretation of Marsh is that the state's
enforcement of its trespass laws against the defendants for exercising protected freedoms is critical
to the case. See Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal
Rights from Invasion through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952). Despite the
overlap, the classification is well enough defined so that discussion of public function authority is
not helpful in analyzing the type of state action case under discussion-public aid to private
institutions.
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private actor's general operation," judicial enforcement of private dis-
criminatory 9 or otherwise injurious" conduct, or legislative encourage-
ment of or complicity in private activity,4' enforcement has hinged on a
finding of some causal relation between the state and private activity
that would support an attribution of that activity to the state.
2
The problem of state aid to private institutions has never lent itself
well to this kind of analysis.43 Of course, state assistance can take many
forms: direct financial assistance in the form of legislative appropria-
tions, use of government property on advantageous terms, loan guaran-
tees, or allowing the beneficiary to exercise the power of eminent do-
main. The kind of financial assistance represented by a tax exemption,
however, is a conspicuously nebulous factor in the relationship between
the state and the recipient. Prior to 1961, the case law clearly sup-
ported the comment by one writer that "the fact that a state appropri-
ates money to a private . . . institution has nothing to do with the
determination of whether the acts of the. . . institution constitute state
39E.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 40 U.S.L.W. 4715 (U.S. June 13, 1972), revg. Irvis v.
Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
"Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
"°New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
"Trhe requirement of a causal relation between the state and private activity was recently
articulated in Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). Responding to the claim that New York's
regulation of educational standards in private colleges renders a college's acts in curtailing protest
the acts of the state, Judge Friendly noted that the contention
overlooks the essential point-that the state must be involved not simply with some
activity of the institution alleged to have inflicted the injury but with the activity that
caused the injury. . . . [Tihe fact that New York has exercised some regulatory powers
over the standard of education offered by [the college] does not implicate it generally in
[the college's] policies toward demonstrations and discipline.
Id. at 81.
"3Part of the reason for the uneasy fit of governmental assistance cases is the lack of any
authoritative consideration of the problem in the Supreme Court. Lower courts have had to deal
with the problem by drawing on principles developed in often radically different contexts. Of
course, since use of governmental property is one form of state assistance, the leading case on the
use of governmental property, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961),
suggests itself. But the multiplicity of factors on which the Court based its finding of state action
in Burton makes it extremely difficult to isolate those properly labeled "assistance" from their
opposites-facts establishing the benefits flowing to the municipal corporation. The only true
similarity Burton bears to Pitts is the innocence with which the state activity was undertaken. The
Burton finding of state action must rest in the last analysis on public ownership of the leased
property. Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 1458, 1464-65 (1961).
41See Lewis, supra note 43, at 1464 n.23.
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action."45 The matter was consistently viewed by the courts as one of
agency, financial assistance being relevant only as it bore on the ques-
tion of state control.46 As one court put it:
It is well settled that aid given by a government to a private
corporation is not enough in itself to change the character of the
corporation from private to public.
...If each time a government lends its assistance to a private institu-
tion it were to acquire that institution as an arm of government, then
government would indeed become a many armed thing. 7
The erosion of the agency approach began in 1961 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority." The
question there was whether a private restaurateur, the lessee of space
in a municipal parking facility, could constitutionally refuse to serve
Negroes. In holding the discrimination to be state action, the Court
pointed to a number of contacts between the lessee and the municipal-
ity-such as public ownership of the real estate and the consequent tax
exemption for any improvements made by the lessee, the Authority's
responsibility for upkeep and maintenance, and the fact that rental
revenue was an "indispensable part of the State's plan to operate its
project as a self-sustaining unit."49 Describing its approach as one of
"sifting facts and weighing circumstances [so that] the nonobvious in-
volvement of the State in private conduct [can] be attributed its true
significance,""0 the court concluded that "[t]he State [had] so far insin-
4 Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43
CORNELL L.Q. 375, 391 (1958). The author suggests that while financial aid alone may be irrele-
vant, it would be unconstitutional if coupled with (1) a degree of control which is "unusual" in the
sense that it is distinguishable in some way from that under the general police power or with (2)
impermissible motive, as where a state appropriates money to a private institution in order that
the recipient might be able to accomplish a purpose which the state could not accomplish directly.
Id. at 390; cf. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
"Compare Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
721 (1945) (library required to admit blacks to its training course where 99% of its budget was
financed by the city), with Norris v. Mayor & City Council, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948) (state
and city annual appropriations, plus lease of building for nominal rental, not state action requiring
private school to admit blacks), and Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, 157 F. Supp.
101 (D.D.C. 1957) (use of municipal property for meetings, cooperation of police in securing
members and donations, and services of policemen in coordinating club activities did not require
Boys Club to integrate).
"7Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, 157 F. Supp. 101, 107-08 (D.D.C. 1957).
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uated itself into a position of interdependence with [the restaurant] that
it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity
. ... , While it is clear that the Burton case repudiated the strict
agency test without replacing it, it is just as clear that "significant
involvement" contemplates something more than the mere grant of tax
exempt status to private charitable organizations. The move from
Burton to Pitts is aided by principles stemming from another recent
Supreme Court decision, Reitman v. Mulkey, 2 holding unconstitutional
an amendment to the California constitution prohibiting open housing
legislation because it "significantly encourage[d] and involve[d] the
State in private discriminations.
'5 3
Pitts, then, represents a synthesis of Reitman and Burton that
equates "encouragement" of racial discrimination with "significant in-
volvement." However, neither Reitman nor Burton justifies the court's
abandonment of the causation principle. The Pitts court looked at the
legislative enactment of tax benefits-clearly state action-and at the
fact that the private recipients of those benefits practice racial discrimi-
nation, but it never examined the relationship between the state and
private activities to see if one is in any way responsible for the other.
The court betrayed this cumulative reasoning process by its declaration
that a "different standard must be applied to ascertain state action in
cases involving equal protection than in cases involving other rights." 4
If this statement means that the same state activity may constitute a
violation of some rights and not of others, it accords with the weight of
modern authority: a finding of state action violating a particular right
does not render the private actor a plenary state agent subject to all
constitutional prohibitions." But in a later passage the court says that
it cannot decide the state action question "in a vacuum" but must
examine the state conduct "both in the light of the right it allegedly
violates and in the light of the right under which it is asserted to be
proper." 6 The constitutional interests to be balanced, the opinion con-
51Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
52387 U.S. 369 (1967).
1Id. at 381.
5333 F. Supp. at 668.
"See, e.g., Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 445 F.2d 1150, 1155 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1971); Wolin v.
Port Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1969); Powe v. Miles,
407 F.2d 73, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1968); Lewis,supra note 14, at 1119-20. Butsee Abernathy, supra note
45, at 416-17.
"1333 F. Supp. at 669.
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tinues, are the "right to equal protection of the laws against a right of
certain organizations to discriminate in their membership on the basis
of race . . . ."I In thus focusing on the plaintiffs' rights as against
those of the charitable organization, instead of on the plaintiffs' rights
against the state, the court is allowing the enormity of the violation
charged-racial discrimination-to compensate for the deficiency of the
state's involvement in it. If the necessary state activity is minimal in
racial discrimination cases, it is submitted that the reason is because the
substantive right is more easily violated, that less activity on the part
of the state may be required to encourage racial discrimination than to
encourage deprivation of freedom of expression or procedural due pro-
cess.
The question is whether "significant encouragement" means actual
encouragement of the discriminatory conduct or merely a showing that
the actor, as distinguished from his acts, is in some way supported by
the state. It is on this point that the McGlotten court's approach differs
from that in Pitts. The McGlotten court framed the issue this way:
To demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the challenged deduc-
tions plaintiff must ...show that they in fact aid, perpetuate, or
encourage racial discrimination. . . .Every deduction in the tax laws
provides a benefit to the class who may take advantage of it. . . .An
additional line of inquiry is essential, one considering the nature of the
Government activity in providing the challenged benefit and necessar-
ily involving the sifting and weighing prescribed in Burton.58
The McGlotten court specifically found the Internal Revenue Code
provisions for charitable contribution deductions to be a stamp of ap-
proval59 of discriminatory activities and concluded that
[t]he public nature of the activity delegated to the organization in
question, the degree of control the Government has retained as to the
purposes and organizations which may benefit, and the aura of Gov-
ernment approval inherent in an exempt ruling by the Internal Reve-
nue Service, all serve to distinguish the benefits at issue from the
general run of deductions available under the Internal Revenue Code."
However accurate or inaccurate the McGlotten court's factual ap-
57
1d.
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praisal, its approach is in marked contrast to that in Pitts. The Pitts
decision goes a long way toward imposing on government a constitu-
tional duty to insure that no recipient of its financial aid practices racial
discrimination."' Almost a decade ago scholars began to prophesy the
end of the distinction between state and private action under the four-
teenth amendment. 2 The courts have not yet abandoned the distinction,
but the Pitts-McGlotten fact situation presents the terminal case. The
reason the state action analysis breaks down at this point lies in its
origin as a largely ad hoc reconciliation between the early judicial inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment and the necessity of insuring the
continued vitality of constitutionally guaranteed civil rights and liber-
ties. Enforcing the fourteenth amendment against private acts almost
invariably requires the court to balance a claim of right based on the
amendment's violation against an opposing claim that the challenged
activity is itself constitutionally protected. A doctrine developed in this
"The implicated tax laws alone present a parade of horrors to give any court pause. Are not
estate and gift tax deductions for charitable bequests subject to invalidation under the Pitts
reasoning if the bequest is to a racially discriminatory institution? What about the income tax
deduction for mortgage interest where the taxpayer refuses to sell his residential property to a
black? Will the same homeowner lose his standard deduction? What about accelerated deprecia-
tion, capital gains treatment, and ordinary and necessary business expense deductions? As to
expense, interest, and depreciation deductions, one writer, pointing out that "even criminal enter-
prises may deduct their business expenditures," suggests that exemptions that stem from the
definition of taxable income-from the policy of taxing net income rather than gross re-
ceipts-should not be subjected to equal protection challenges based on the taxpayer's bigotry.
Note, 68 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 9, at 938. Accelerated depreciation and capital gains rates
can be distinguished on the ground that whereas charitable exemptions and deductions advance
"social" goals, "a provision purporting to serve macroeconomic ends is not necessarily anomalous
or objectionable even where the institution it aids is an objectionable one." Id. at 939. It is difficult
to see how either of these distinctions has any bearing on the "significant involvement" of the state
under the Pitts reasoning, where the mere fact of financial support controls and the nature or
purpose of the aid is not deemed a proper subject of consideration.
The McGlotten court distinguished between provisions that "operate to provide a grant of...
funds through the tax system" and those that are "part and parcel of defining appropriate subjects
of taxation" in discussing the deduction for "exempt function income" of private clubs provided
by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(7). 338 F. Supp. at 458. But the decision-that INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(7) as applied to segregated organizations was constitutional while the
§ 501(c)(8) exemption of "passive investment income" of fraternal orders was unconstitutional
when so applied-was not based on this distinction. The court noted the arm's-length nature of
the lease in Burton and concluded that the fact "that the Government provides no monetary benefit
does not . . . insulate its involvement from constitutional scrutiny." 338 F. Supp. at 458. Section
501(c)(8) was distinguished on the narrow ground that it "does not limit its coverage to particular
activities; exemption is given to 'clubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation
and other nonprofitable purposes .... "' Id. (Emphasis by the court)
2See Williams, supra note 35.
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context is of very little usefulness in coming to grips with the sort of
pocketbook interest asserted in Pitts and McGlotten, in which the plain-
tiffs did not even suggest that the organizations the tax benefits of which
they attacked do not have the right to discriminate in their choice of
associates.6 3 However salutary the result in Pitts and McGlotten, it
should not rest on a finding that unnecessarily undermines the freedom
to engage in an activity that is not even challenged.64 As far as the state's
"significant involvement" is concerned, it is not clear on what basis past
financial aid can be distinguished from a continuing subsidy. How far
removed is the Pitts holding from one that finds in the historical grant
of tax benefits sufficient state action to compel private clubs to open
their doors to persons of all races?65 Compulsory association of this sort
may be the inevitable upshot of modern judicial attitudes in the area of
race relations, and it may even reflect good social policy.66 But the
conflicting interests to be adjusted have nothing to do with the Pitts
problem, where plaintiffs asserted only the right of a taxpayer not to
have his tax burden increased as a result of exclusion from the tax base
of the income and property of organizations that exclude him solely
because of his race.
Sooner or later the Supreme Court must address the problem of
6 Abernathy, supra note 45, at 390-91, 394, suggests that where the state aid itself is chal-
lenged the proper analysis is under the due process clause. But see Lewis, supra note 14, at 1105-
06.
An attack on state assistance at its source after conceding the private character of the recipient
was tried in both the Norris and Mitchell cases, discussed note 46 supra. In each instance the claim
based on the rights of complainants as citizens and taxpayers was rejected. Assuming the applica-
bility to exemptions of the Flast doctrine, the question remains whether the difference in the nature
of the right claimed puts a different substantive constitutional question before the courts. The court
in Pitts recognized the difference in remedial postures but failed to accord it the proper significance,
concluding only that it "may bear upon the weight to be accorded to the prerogatives of private
organizations in balancing them against the rights asserted. . . . [I]n neither instance will the tax
exemption transgress the Fourteenth Amendment unless with respect to the particular rights said
to be infringed, the state involvement can be asid to'be significant." 333 F. Supp. at 666.
cAlthough the court notes that "nothing in the present record indicates that the court could
order desegregation of the organizations the right of which to tax exemptions is challenged," 333
F. Supp. at 667 n.10, it also states, apparently recognizing the implications of its finding of
"significant involvement," that "any private right to discriminate is not constitutionally pro-
tected." Id. at 664 n.4.
eCf Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966), in which the Court held that the "momen-
tum" gained by a segregated park from its history of, inter alia, tax exempt status was "certainly
not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of 'private' trustees." *
"'See generally Black, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69
(1967).
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state financial aid to restricted clubs." A definitive statement in this
area is long overdue, and the delay is largely responsible for the diver-
gent paths taken by the lower federal courts in Pitts, McGlotten, and
Green. When it comes, it is to be hoped that the Court will adopt an
approach that focuses on the real interests at stake, one more intellec-
tually coherent than the almost metaphysical attempt to find "signifi-
cant state involvement" in the mere grant of tax benefits.
JOSEPH W. FREEMAN, JR.
Constitutional Law-The Equal Protection Clause and the Student's
Right to Vote Where He Attends School
The right of students to vote in the communities where they attend
school has become an issue of vastly greater significance since the
twenty-sixth amendment was ratified on June 30, 1971. Now that the
age barrier has fallen,' the number of eligible student voters has in-
creased, as have fears in some college communities that students may
now be able to control local elections. Whether this spectre will mater-
ialize depends on many factors, but the principal obstacle remaining is
"The district court decision in Green was affirmed per curiam. Coit v. Green, 92 S. Ct. 564
(1971). In Pills the defendant did not appeal, and there has been no reported Supreme Court
disposition in McGlotten. Any future disposition of a recent Alabama federal district court deci-
sion, Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 337 F. Supp. 22 (M.D. Ala. 1972), should be noted. The
court there held that the city of Montgomery may not permit the use of its recreational facilities
by private segregated academies, saying "what is important is the effect the state's aid has on the
maintenance of a racially balanced public school system, but . . . the extent of the aid provided is
immaterial." Id. at 24. Turning to the problem of use of the same facilities by private groups other
than schools, the court felt
the test should be somewhat different. Whereas state and city officials are under an
affirmative obligation to end discrimination in situations involving education, this af-
firmative duty does not extend to cases involving private groups other than those affili-
ated with schools. Consequently, although state aid to such a group is unconstitutional
if the organization discriminates on the basis of race, the mere fact that such an organi-
zation is segregated is not enough to render state aid to it per se constitutionally impro-
per.
Id. at 25-26.
'A recent California case held unconstitutional the presumption that the residence of unmar-
ried minors is at the home of their parents. The fact that students brought the suit was only
incidental since the discrimination was "on account of age." Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565,
570-575, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699-703, 488 P.2d 1, 4-7 (1971); accord, Ownby v. Dies, 337 F. Supp.
38 (E.D. Tex. 1971) [declaring TEx. ELECTION CODE art. 5.08(m) (Supp. 1972) unconstitutional].
